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Abstract: Cognitivism about the emotions is the view that emotions involve 
judgments (or quasi-judgmental cognitive states) that we could, in principle, articulate 
without reference to the emotions themselves.  D’Arms and Jacobson (2003) argue 
that no such articulation is available in the case of “possessive” emotions, such as 
pride and guilt, and, so, cognitivism (in regard to such emotions, at least) is false.  
This article proposes and defends a cognitivist account of our partiality to the objects 
of our pride.  I argue that taking pride in something requires judging that your relation 
to that thing indicates that your life accords with some of your personal ideals.  This 
cognitivist account eschews glossing pride in terms of one’s “possession” of what one 
is proud of and, so, escapes D’Arms and Jacobson’s critique.  I motivate this account 
by critically assessing the most sophisticated possession-based account of pride in the 
literature, found in Gabriele Taylor (1985).   
 
 
In Xenophon’s Socratic dialogue, Symposium, the dinner party guests discuss what they each 
find most worthy of pride [mega phronein]:  Autolykos cites his father, Antisthenes his 
wealth, Kritoboulos his beauty, and Nikeratos his ability to recite Homer from memory.  
Socrates, ever surprising and forever shocking, refers to his ability to render people attractive 
to the entire community by claiming that he is most proud of his “skill as a pimp 
[mastropeia]” (1990, p. 238, 3.10)!1 
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Clearly, the emotion of pride takes a wide range of objects. This heterogeneity makes 
accounting for the general relation between a person and the object of their pride particularly 
difficult.  For the vastly different kinds of things that we are proud of—including our family 
members, our possessions, our physical appearance, and our abilities—seem to be related to 
us in different kinds of ways. Indeed, one would be forgiven for being skeptical of ever 
finding, as Hume put it, “that common circumstance, in which all these objects agree” (1978, 
p. 659-660).  
Some philosophers argue that the concept of possession can help us to explain the 
unity underlying the heterogeneity of pride’s objects (Isenberg, 1949; Foot, 1958; Kenny, 
1963; Davidson, 1976; Baier, 1980; Taylor, 1985).  On this view, pride is an emotion that we 
feel towards what we judge to be valuable qualities in our possession.  Arnold Isenberg 
provides the earliest systematic philosophical account of this kind: “The definition of pride, 
then, has three parts.  There is (1) a quality which (2) is approved (or considered desirable) 
and (3) is judged to belong to oneself” (1949, p. 3).  However, such a judgment appears to be 
neither necessary nor sufficient for pride.  We may take pride in our grandparents’ 
achievements, even though we do not take ourselves to possess our grandparents or their 
achievements (or, at least, we no more take ourselves to “possess” them than we do our 
colleague’s grandparents or their achievements, about which pride may be unintelligible).  
On the other hand, we might not take pride in our health or our wealth, even if we judge that 
we possess these valuable qualities.  So, it seems that possession cannot explain our partiality 
to the objects of our pride.  But no other substantive account of this partiality relation appears 
to be viable.2 
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Some draw a general conclusion about the nature of emotions from the failure to 
substantively characterize this relation.  Justin D’Arms and Daniel Jacobson argue that this 
failure undermines the cognitivist or “quasijudgmentalist” framework commonly employed 
in the analysis of pride and other “possessive” emotions: 
What sense can be made of the possessive pronouns that arise in glosses of pride, 
guilt, and many other emotions?  We contend that by claiming thoughts of possession 
to be a necessary constituent of pride, the judgmentalist tradition has things 
backwards.  The sense in which the club’s accomplishments belong to the fan is 
simply that he is able to be proud of them.  It is, after all, “his team”—but in this 
sense only.  Should the quasijudgmentalist fall back on the claim that the fan feels as 
if the triumph were his own, we would suggest that the only sense in which this is true 
is the trivializing sense: he is proud of it.  (2003, pp. 135-136) 
Cognitivism about the emotions is the view that emotions involve, and thus conceptually 
depend upon, judgments (or other quasi-judgmental cognitive states) that we could, in 
principle, articulate without reference to the emotions themselves.  D’Arms and Jacobson 
argue that no such articulation is available in the case of possessive emotions like pride, and, 
so, cognitivism (in regard to possessive emotions, at least) is false.  This conclusion, in turn, 
has profound meta-ethical significance.  For it rescues from the charge of circularity the 
Humean project of understanding evaluative judgments in terms of emotional reactions 
(Foot, 1958).  
My aim in this article is to propose and defend a cognitivist account of pride’s 
partiality relation without appealing to the concept of possession or belonging.  I argue that 
taking pride in something requires judging that your relation to that thing indicates that your 
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life accords with some of your personal ideals.3  Such judgments, and the personal ideals that 
they are about, are explanatorily prior to, and specifiable independently of, one’s emotional 
responses.  That is, what personal ideals one has is not cashed out in terms of, among other 
things, what one takes pride in; rather, what one takes pride in is cashed out in terms of what 
personal ideals one has—that is, in terms of what judgments one makes about the kind of life 
one should live.  I thereby defend an account of the type that D’Arms and Jacobson argue 
cannot be found.  
In Section 1, I motivate this account by critically assessing the most sophisticated 
possession-based account of pride in the literature, found in Gabriele Taylor (1985).  In 
Section 2, I sketch the personal ideals account of pride.  In Section 3, I show that this account 
provides necessary (cognitive) conditions for feeling pride, as well as the necessary and 
sufficient conditions under which a token of pride accurately represents its intentional object, 
without invoking the concept of possession.  I also address concerns that cognitivist accounts 
cannot plausibly explain the possibility of recalcitrant emotions.   
Before beginning, I should clarify that this paper focuses on the occurent emotion of 
pride, not pride understood as a dispositional or background emotion.  This paper also does 
not engage with the literature about the character trait of pride and its relation to self-respect, 
humility, and other dispositions (Kristjánsson, 2001; Fischer, 2012 and 2016).  My aim is to 
vindicate a cognitivist account of the occurent emotion of pride, and to do so without 
appealing to any substantive conception of possession.  
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1. TAYLOR’S ACCOUNT OF EMOTIONAL POSSESSION 
According to Gabriele Taylor, pride is founded upon the relation of belonging that is 
believed to hold between the self and the object of pride.  To take pride in something, on 
Taylor’s view, is to see its belonging to oneself as an accomplishment.  A person sees 
something as an accomplishment, Taylor says, when “she values it in that she sees it as being 
beyond her norm of expectations in the sense of it being better than for some reason or 
another she thinks she is, or others are, entitled to expect” (1985, p. 41).  
The relation of belonging at play in Taylor’s account is in two respects more 
expansive than in Isenberg’s account.  First, Taylor stresses that instances of the relation may 
have more than two places, e.g., that you and I belong to the same group.  So my pride in my 
grandfather may be expressed as my seeing the fact that he and I belong to the same family 
as an achievement.  Furthermore, as this example illustrates, Taylor proposes that the 
relevant sense of belonging is a multi-directional relation: the object of pride might belong to 
me; I might belong to the object of my pride (as with group pride); or I might belong to the 
same group as the object of my pride.  
Second, Taylor expands the sorts of objects between which this relation can hold.  
Taylor offers the following illustrations:  
…we may treat the case of ‘being responsible for’ as falling under the relation of 
belonging: where an agent is proud of something he has brought about, that which he 
has brought about would then be regarded as an event which ‘belongs’ to the agent in 
the sense that he is at least partially responsible for its existence.  We may treat 
similarly the case where a person is proud not of something he has or has done, but is 
proud of standing in a certain relationship to a thing or person.  He is proud not of his 
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beautiful house, but is proud of owning a house (any old house).  ‘Owning a house’ is 
now what he sees as desirable and as ‘belonging’ to him.  It may belong to him in the 
sense that it is a state he is responsible for having brought about.  But ownership of 
that house may have fallen into his lap without any effort on his part.  Then the 
ownership is a belonging of his in much the same way as his personal characteristic, 
his handsome face or his sense of humour, may be said to be belongings of his.  
(1985, p. 32) 
Taylor’s examples of pride are all plausible.  Taylor rightly wants to ensure that her account 
captures not only pride in something one has or has done, but also pride in standing in a 
certain relationship to a thing or person.  Not only might there be pride in one’s good deeds 
or one’s beautiful house, but, as Taylor notes, one might feel proud that one stands in the 
relation of moral responsibility or ownership to such things.  In that event, one’s owning a 
house, and not the house itself, is what the person would see as belonging to herself.  This 
distinction is delicate, but insightful.  A person might easily be proud of having a garden or 
owning a nice piece of jewelry; more difficult to understand, and in any case very different, is 
a person who is proud of the garden or the jewelry itself.4  
The question before us is whether the relation of belonging best makes sense of these 
examples.  I suggest that it does not.  When Taylor extends the sense of belonging, we are 
left with nothing more than the notion of predicating some quality or attribute of oneself.  
Recall that my pride in owning a house entails, on Taylor’s view, that I believe the attribute 
“owning a house” belongs to me.  Taylor emphasizes that the sense of belonging need not be 
fleshed out with the owner’s being responsible for having brought his ownership about.  He 
might have merely inherited the house.  To see that “belonging” has come down to merely 
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predicating some quality or attribute of oneself, consider another example.  Suppose I am 
proud of the fact that I don’t own a house (being a communist).  On Taylor’s analysis, the 
quality, “not owning a house,” belongs to me.  Even the property of living in the same world 
as Mark Rothko’s paintings belongs to me.  These examples suggest that “belonging” 
excludes little, if anything.   
While it is true that one can feel proud of nearly anything—that is, insofar as one can 
think the relevant proposition about nearly anything—an account of pride must have some 
content to it so that we might, when appropriate, deny that someone is related to the object of 
pride in a way that renders pride accurate.  Such an account needs to explain not only the 
propriety, when it is appropriate, of my colleague feeling closely related her grandparent’s 
achievements; it must also explain the impropriety, when it is inappropriate, of my feeling 
closely related to those achievements.  It must explain what is inaccurate or false, in cases 
where it is inaccurate or false, about my being proud of living in a world with Rothko’s 
paintings.  Taylor intends to provide such an explanation by appeal to the idea of belonging.  
“Thinning out” the relation of belonging, though, removes its explanatory power.  It cannot 
explain the error, in cases where it is erroneous, of my feeling partial to my colleague’s 
grandparents or Rothko’s paintings.  
At one point, Taylor does confront the insufficiency of “belonging” to flesh out the 
emotional partiality that pride embodies: “It is of course a fact about a person that he belongs 
to this family, that country or profession, and it may be a fact to which he pays little or no 
attention.  But if he is proud of his grandfather, his local football team, or his predecessor 
then it must be a fact that weighs with him” (1985, p. 31).  The metaphor of weight adds 
much needed substance to the belonging relation.  Perhaps what weighs with one, what one 
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sees as important, picks out the salient sense of partiality.  This idea (undeveloped in 
Taylor’s work) is promising, and I develop it in a cognitivist direction in the following 
section.  I conclude this section by noting that the weighing metaphor does the work that the 
belonging account was supposed to do.  Given that Taylor’s is the most sophisticated 
belonging-based account of pride, my analysis of it supports D’Arms and Jacobson’s claim 
that “belonging” is a mere distraction in the analysis of pride.5  
 
2.  THE PERSONAL IDEALS ACCOUNT 
Let us begin afresh.  Based on my reading of the philosophical and psychological literature 
on pride, cited below, I claim that any adequate account of the emotion of pride must be able 
to explain (or, if need be, explain away) four paradigm cases of pride: achievement pride, gift 
pride, ownership pride, and group pride.   
Achievement is the most commonly cited paradigm of pride (e.g., Solomon, 1976, p. 
345; Tracy and Robbins, 2004, p. 173; Kauppinen, 2017). Watching the Olympic games 
supplies plenty of evidence for the prevalence of the view that pride in achievement is 
appropriate, and sometimes valuable.  Notably, it does not appear that Olympians take pride 
in their bodily or mental qualities alone—they take pride in their victories (which are events), 
as well.  A natural explanation is that the achievement, teleologically characterized, is 
thought to be pride-worthy.  Call this the achievement paradigm of pride.   
On the other hand, pride is sometimes directed towards qualities having nothing at all 
to do with one’s agency (e.g., Taylor, 1985; Tracy and Robbins, 2007, p. 149). A person 
might take pride in her god-given physical agility or in her booming voice.  In American 
Pastoral, Philip Roth offers an example of the same general sort: “Just a little ways from the 
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church are The Oaks, a pair of two-hundred-year-old oak trees that are the town’s pride” 
(Roth, 1998, p. 167).  Call this the gift paradigm of pride.   
Between these two extremes lie paradigms involving varying degrees of agency.  For 
instance, in Hume’s view, “the relation, which is esteem’d the closest, and which of all others 
produces most commonly the passion of pride, is that of property” (Hume, 1978, p. 309).  
Call this the ownership paradigm of pride.  Pride in one’s possessions is unlike both 
achievement pride and gift pride.  Ownership pride lacks the teleology of achievement pride.  
Indeed, someone’s pride in her house need not be based in any activity of hers since, as 
Taylor notes, she might have inherited it. On the other hand, ownership pride is distinct from 
gift pride since it reflects specific ownership rights that one may exercise, or transfer (Baier, 
1980a, p. 140; Baier, 1980b, p. 405).  
To these three paradigms of pride we must add group pride (Neu, 1998).6  Group 
pride is familiar in both public and private realms.  Family pride, national pride, racial pride, 
ethnic pride, and LGBTQ pride are ubiquitous and often named as such, as are sports team 
pride and school pride.  While there is disagreement about whether group pride is accurate or 
praiseworthy, it is of such historical and political significance that it counts as a paradigm of 
pride and so must be accounted for.  Even immoral group pride, such as Aryan pride, counts 
as pride and so its intelligibility must be accounted for.  
An appeal to the proud subject’s personal ideals helps to explain each of the four 
paradigm cases, and provides the key to developing a set of necessary judgments for feeling 
pride, as well as the conditions under which a token of pride accurately represents its 
intentional object.  In particular, these cases all involve someone taking themself to be living 
in accordance with their personal ideals in virtue of the object of their pride.7  
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Taking pride in something requires taking your relation to that thing to indicate that 
your life accords with some personal ideal of yours.  Elizabeth Anderson succinctly 
characterizes such ideals as a person’s “conceptions of what kind of person she ought to be, 
what kinds of character, attitudes, concerns, and commitments she should have” (1993, p. 
6). 8   Such concerns and commitments may include personal relationships as well as 
individualistic projects.  Like the possible objects of pride, the possible content of a person’s 
ideals is broad, tracking the many ways she might evaluate herself.  It is easy to take for 
granted the role played by personal ideals in the explanation of a person’s pride, but 
appropriate thought-experiments bring this role to the fore.  
To regard an event as a pride-worthy achievement involves regarding it as evidence 
of having the sort of character and commitments, or succeeding in the sorts of activities, that 
you think you should have or do.  The proud Olympic medalist takes her victory to show that 
she has succeeded in contests that matter, or that she has the courage and tenacity of a 
champion.  An athlete who has long aspired to such achievement, and who would evaluate 
herself poorly if she failed, would have reason to feel pride upon winning.  On the other 
hand, when an Olympic medalist discovers that she is happy with, but not particularly proud 
of, setting a world record and personal best, the obvious interpretation is that she has 
discovered that such success doesn’t matter to her to any significant degree and hence is not 
significantly bound up with any of her personal ideals.   
Does the claim that, like this Olympian, (1) you might discover which personal ideals 
you have (or lack) by observing what you take pride in conflict with the claim that (2) feeling 
pride and having personal ideals are cognitive states?  You might think it does, if you assume 
that only non-cognitive states can be discovered like this.  But I deny this assumption.  Since 
 11 
one often engages in cognitive activity without explicit awareness of having done so, and 
since such activity is often embedded in our unreflective interpretations of the world, we 
must distinguish between what one really thinks (broadly construed) and what one thinks one 
thinks.  Discovering your personal ideals by noting what you take pride in is, in my view, 
discovering what you really think (and not merely how you non-cognitively respond or feel).  
Noticing when one does or doesn’t feel pride can help one discover the judgments embedded 
in one’s “cognitive sets”: cognitive mental states that, as Karen Jones puts it, “(1) focus 
attention, (2) direct inquiry, (3) shape interpretation, and (4) structure inference” (2004, p. 
336; see also Calhoun, 1984).  A cognitive account of pride need not say that pride requires 
the specific cognitive states of belief or otherwise easily articulated judgment.  
Pride in one’s possessions, gifts, and membership in social groups also reflects 
aspects of one’s cognitive sets that relate to personal ideals.  Ownership of fancy cars and 
houses is a matter of pride only when we evaluate ourselves in terms of whether our lifestyles 
are luxurious.  Likewise with respect to gifts and group affiliations.  If one is proud of one’s 
lustrous hair, one’s Japanese ancestry, one’s natural citizenship, or one’s sense of balance, 
then one must regard these qualities as mattering to whether one accords with one’s personal 
ideals.  If one does not tend to experience pride in such things, then one is unlikely to care 
much about the relevant personal ideals.  When a sibling, a citizen, or a musician says that 
she’s not proud of the excellences of her sister, country, or sense of rhythm, then we have 
compelling evidence that she is not committed to certain related personal ideals.  
The correct attribution of pride depends upon the success conditions of the relevant 
personal ideal, and there is no reason to believe—and every reason to deny—that all personal 
ideals require some one substantive relation to hold between self and object.  Rather, living 
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in accordance with different personal ideals requires substantively different relations to 
objects of pride.9  The success conditions for the ideal of being a great jazz pianist differ 
greatly from the success conditions for the ideal of being a great sports fan or being a great 
citizen.  The conditions of partiality—that is, of what makes the object of my pride closely 
related to me—will differ in each case, though they are in each case a function of the relevant 
personal ideal.   
This pluralistic feature of personal ideals provides the key for responding to D’Arms 
and Jacobson’s pessimistic conclusion about the prospects of a cognitivist account of 
emotional partiality.  Although D’Arms and Jacobson are correct to note that there is no 
general and substantive set of necessary conditions for making sense of the possessiveness of 
the emotion of pride, that fact does not undermine the cognitivist account of pride under 
discussion.  
 
3.  CONSTITUTIVE COGNITIONS OF PRIDE 
On the personal ideals-based account of pride sketched in the previous section, the following 
constitutive cognitions jointly individuate pride from other types of emotions: 
(1) The descriptive judgment(s) that: 
a. some object exists, did exist, or will exist; 
b. some proposition is true; 
c. some event occurred, is occurring, or will occur; 
d. some relation obtains, obtained, or will obtain; or 
e. some object had, has, or will have some property.  
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(2) The normative judgment that the content of the descriptive judgment(s) provides 
evidence that one is living in accordance with some of one’s personal ideals; and 
(3) The normative judgment that the relevant personal ideals are worthy of one’s 
adoption or pursuit.  
The discussion of the previous section provided a prima facie argument that tokening these 
three types of judgments is necessary for feeling pride at all.  I also suggested that failing to 
feel pride on some occasion provides evidence that one fails to token one or more of these 
judgments.  (I leave open the question of whether making these judgments suffices for 
feeling pride.)   
These judgments are necessary constituents of pride.  Pride differs from joy and 
delight insofar as it requires self-regarding normative judgments of the form listed above.  
Someone who satisfies condition (1) might feel joy or delight about getting the sugary dessert 
they wanted, even if getting or eating dessert is no part of their personal ideals (thus failing to 
satisfy conditions (2) and (3)).  Taking pride in getting some sugary dessert is possible, I 
suppose, but only if you regard it as evincing that you are the kind of person you ought to be 
or that you have the kind of commitments you ought to have.  Perhaps you struggled mightily 
to achieve the financial security that allows you to have this dessert.  Or perhaps you regard 
this dessert as a gift that represents having the family life that you judge you ought to have.   
These three conditions furthermore help to supply conditions under which one’s pride 
accurately represents its intentional object.  For, one’s pride accurately represents its object 
(or, as I shall sometimes say, following D’Arms and Jacobson, one’s pride is fitting) just 
when these three judgments are true.  So, while one can feel pride even if these judgments 
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are false, one’s pride is accurate (or fitting) just when they are all true.  In this section, I 
discuss and defend the account largely in terms of accurate representation.   
First, one’s pride accurately represents its intentional object only when it is 
descriptively accurate (condition (1)).  Being disqualified from a race undermines the 
fittingness of pride about having won the race.10  Since pride may take various metaphysical 
kinds of intentional objects, this condition is disjunctive.  If the intentional object is a 
proposition (e.g., I won the race) then the proposition must be true; if the object is an event 
(e.g., my victory) then it must have occurred; if the object is a relation between oneself and 
something (e.g., my ownership of the house), then the relation must obtain; and if the 
intentional object is a property of some individual (e.g., my athletic skill) then the individual 
must have that property. 
Condition (2) concerns the relation between the object of pride, one’s personal ideals, 
and oneself: one’s pride accurately represents its object only when one lives in accordance 
with some of one’s personal ideals in virtue of that object.  Whether this condition is satisfied 
on any given occasion may be a matter of normative controversy.  On some conceptions of 
humility, for example, a humble person holds such high standards for themself that they 
rarely or never satisfy this condition. Consider Gandhi’s remarks about whether the activities 
for which he is famous show that he lived in accordance with his ideals: “The more I reflect 
and look back on the past, the more vividly do I feel my limitations … If anything that I write 
in these pages should strike the reader as being touched with pride, then he must take it that 
there is something wrong with my quest, and that my glimpses are no more than mirage” 
(1957, pp. xii; xiv). 
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Some instances of pride clearly violate this condition, though.  A great movie critic 
who is also a snob might mistakenly judge that her good taste in movies reflects a general 
intellectual or ethical excellence that is absent in those who lack her aesthetic discernment; 
and someone who is not only proud of his family but also an aristocratic snob might 
mistakenly conclude from his grand heritage that his own pursuits and interests are 
honorable.  (Of course, not all great movie critics or descendants of great families are snobs.)  
Thomas Hill, Jr. correctly argues that at the core of snobbery lies the “disposition to count 
people as worthy of ‘honor’ and ‘contempt’ on inadequate grounds, in inappropriate contexts, 
or to an unfitting degree” (Hill, 1991, p. 162).  If so, then, because of this failure of 
normative judgment, the snob tends to violate pride’s second fittingness condition.11  
Condition (3) concerns the normative status of the relevant personal ideals 
themselves: the personal ideals in accordance with which one takes oneself to be living must 
be worthy of adoption or pursuit.  For, on my view, a person has a personal ideal when and 
only when, and because, she judges it (implicitly or explicitly) to be worthy of adoption or 
pursuit.  So, the judgment that one has met some of one’s own ideals presupposes that one 
judges the ideal or ideals to be worthy in this way.  Thus, the worthiness of one’s personal 
ideal stands to pride exactly as danger stands to fear: one can be mistaken about such 
worthiness or danger and, when that is so, such a mistake renders one’s pride or fear 
inaccurate.  So taking pride in something involves not only representing some action, say, as 
indicating that one is living in accordance with a personal ideal; it also involves representing 
this personal ideal as worthy of one’s adoption or pursuit.  It follows that fitting pride 
accurately represents the relevant personal ideal as being worthy of the subject’s adoption or 
pursuit.  (Note that, as in the case of pride in one’s ancestors, the object of pride supplied by 
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condition (1a) may not be adoptable or pursuable.  Rather, in such cases what one judges to 
be worthy of adoption or pursuit is some personal ideal, such as having a wonderful 
family.)12  This consideration delivers the third and final condition.   
The third condition excludes the possibility of accurate pride being based in an 
unworthy ideal.  On this account, a white supremacist’s pride in “white culture,” say, is not 
merely odious but in addition fails to accurately portray its object—in particular, it fails to 
accurately portray its object because it is odious.  (Here I assume without argument that the 
personal ideals undergirding such white pride are unworthy of adoption or pursuit.)  Such a 
consequence invites the charge that this condition imposes extraneous normative standards 
upon the internal logic of pride.  Let us consider this charge in more detail.   
One might argue, as follows, that morally appalling pride can be accurate, for reasons 
analogous to why morally appalling fear can be accurate.  A racially motivated instance of 
fear might be accurate even if the racist attitudes motivating it are morally odious (e.g., if, by 
chance, the object of fear really is threatening).  Analogously, one might urge that the racist’s 
pride can accurately represent its object, and that their fault lies not in any misrepresentation 
but, instead, in the viciousness of taking pride in that object.  Here I am imagining that the 
racist judges, say, that her having only white friends is evidence that she lives in accordance 
with her racist ideals.  And, indeed, this judgment might be true.  So why not conclude that 
such pride is fitting? 
The issue comes down to whether considerations about the worthiness of the subject’s 
ideals are included in the representational content of pride.  I believe that the commonly 
acknowledged fact that only a racist would take pride in this so-called achievement precludes 
the possibility that it is pride-worthy.  For, once one acknowledges the worthlessness of the 
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ideal driving one’s pride one should see that there is simply nothing to be proud of—just as 
one should see that there is nothing to fear once we acknowledge the harmlessness of the 
object of fear.13  By contrast, the fact that only a racist would be afraid in some scenario does 
not preclude the possibility that the apparent threat renders fear fitting. For even if one 
acknowledged that one’s fears were racially motivated, one’s fear could still accurately 
represent the world: that is, the object of one’s fear could really be dangerous.  Therefore, the 
argument by analogy fails.  Pride has normative content in a way that fear does not and, so, 
the third condition does not impose extraneous normative standards upon it.14 
What about the person who discovers that she takes pride in what she judges to be 
unworthy of pride?  Imagine an anti-war American who feels pride when learning of her 
country’s latest military conquest, even though she consciously and sincerely denies that this 
is worthy of pride.  This type of example might suggest that pride does not involve judgment 
at all.  For, pride can be recalcitrant to reasoning in a way that beliefs and other judgments 
typically cannot be.   
Several responses are in order, and ultimately a full account of recalcitrant judgment 
would be required to give a satisfying response to the objection.  I do not attempt to provide 
such an account here, since the main burden of this paper is merely to articulate a non-
possessive account of the cognitions involved in feeling pride.  What follows are sketches of 
a cognitivist account of recalcitrant emotion.   
First, to be clear, all parties agree that the fact that emotions sometimes conflict with 
judgments does not entail that emotions do not involve judgments.  For, all parties allow for 
the possibility—and, perhaps, commonality—of conflicting judgments, especially judgments 
concerning matters in which the stakes are high and the evidence is uncertain (as often occurs 
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regarding what is most important in life).  We must not merely assume that consistency of 
one’s judgments is statistically normal and that irrationality is rare, let alone impossible.   
Second, we should also grant the possibility—and commonality—of self-deception 
and other obstacles to self-knowledge, especially self-knowledge about cognitions relating to 
personally significant matters.  When a jealous person consciously and sincerely rejects the 
judgments that the cognitivist claims jealousy involves, the epistemic status of such rejection 
is unclear.  Should Othello’s therapist believe him if he sincerely denies doubting 
Desdemona’s love for him?15  
Third, and relatedly, when emotions stubbornly conflict with judgments, we must not 
assume that the recalcitrance lies with the emotion.  (One should certainly not build this 
assumption into our definition of recalcitrance, as D’Arms and Jacobson appear to do when 
they initially characterize it thus: “We will say that an emotion is recalcitrant when it exists 
despite the agent’s making a judgment that is in tension with it” (2003, p. 129).)  In some 
circumstances, one’s emotions may be more reasons-responsive than are the beliefs that 
conflict with them.  In such cases we should say that the belief (not the emotion) is 
recalcitrant.  Some Huck Finn-like “reverse akratic” cases illustrate this possibility.   
Fourth, explaining emotional recalcitrance in terms of the interaction between (non-
cognitive) emotional and (cognitive) linguistic evaluative systems, as D’Arms and Jacobson 
appear to do, fails to explain whatever recalcitrance there might be within the linguistic 
system itself, of which a separate explanation would be needed.  And, indeed, beliefs are also 
sometimes recalcitrant to judgment (Peacock, 1999, pp. 242-243; Gendler, 2008, fn. 26; 
Schwitzgebel, 2010). Their explanation of emotional recalcitrance thus carries the price of 
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precluding a unified explanation of recalcitrance, one that accounts for recalcitrance in belief, 
emotion, and desire.   
Finally, as discussed in Section 2, judgments need not be beliefs or even belief-like—
they may instead be embedded in cognitive sets, which may be highly resistant to reasoning 
due to their etiology and their pervasive functional roles in mental life (Calhoun, 1984).  
Again, these responses are not intended to conclusively show that cognitivism about 
emotions can explain the possibility of recalcitrant emotion.  But to my mind, they suggest 
that the possibility of recalcitrant emotion is far from being decisive against cognitivism.  
Returning now to the third condition of the personal ideals account of pride—namely, 
that the relevant personal ideal is worthy of one’s adoption or pursuit—we should consider 
which ideals are worthy.  It would be an exceedingly large task to develop a theory of worthy 
ideals with which we could sharpen this condition, since that topic includes and extends 
beyond all of normative ethics.16  Indeed, one might deny that any headway whatsoever can 
be made in developing a philosophical account of the worthiness of ideals.  I disagree.  
Again, a cognitivist can accept that intuitions about the conditions under which pride is 
accurate guide us in determining which ideals are worthy.  For even if pride’s accuracy is 
analyzed partly in terms of ideals’ worthiness, our intuitions about the former can help us to 
discover what we really think (and not merely what we think we think) about the latter.  So, 
while it is true that discussion about the worthiness of a personal ideal must avoid excessive 
moralizing about what a person should care about (for what a person cares about partially 
constitutes the particular person that she is and helps to make her life worthwhile), I will 
briefly, and without argument, suggest that the following two necessary conditions for the 
worthiness of a personal ideal are worthy of further consideration.   
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One promising, though highly controversial, condition is that living in accordance 
with a worthy personal ideal must not require the violation of any moral obligations.  (Again, 
I do not propose this condition in order to saddle this account of pride with controversial 
claims about the categorical nature of moral reasons; rather, I wish only to allude to one 
dispute that must be resolved in order to completely flesh out the account.)  Reflection on our 
intuitions about whether, say, certain examples of “white pride” accurately represent the 
world suggest that some ideals, like white supremacy, are unworthy on moral grounds.   
A second possible condition on the worthiness of a personal ideal is that living in 
accordance with it must enhance the meaningfulness of one’s life (Kauppinen, 2017).  Trivial 
personal ideals, such as being the best jelly bean counter, appear to fail this test, at least 
insofar as examples of pride taken in such “achievements” strike us as being inaccurate.  
However, I will leave discussion of these controversial matters for another time.   
 
4.  CONCLUSION 
The personal ideals account of pride reveals as quixotic the search for a single partiality 
relation, like possession, that holds in all cases of fitting pride.  There is no substantive 
special relation that all proud agents take, in virtue of their being proud, to hold between 
themselves and the objects of their pride.  Existing accounts of the pride relation cannot make 
good sense of all paradigm cases of pride.  The personal ideals account, on the other hand, 
allows that each personal ideal sets its own success conditions—living up to some ideals 
requires the exercise of one’s agency, while others require, say, mere ownership or familial 
connections.  There is no relation that all people, with respect to all worthy ideals, bear to 
each thing that counts in favor of their living in accordance with their ideals.  
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The personal ideals account provides a non-vacuous and non-circular (even if only 
schematic) explanation of which relations ground pride: a person takes pride in something 
only if they take their relation to it to indicate that they are living in accordance with a 
personal ideal of theirs.  Thus, I reject the skeptical conclusion regarding cognitivism about 
the emotions that D’Arms and Jacobson have drawn from the fact that there is no substantive 
account of emotional partiality available in the case of pride.  For the characterization in 
terms of personal ideals is conceptually independent of pride, and so provides a (non-
circular) explanation of what any given person is disposed to be proud of.  
The personal ideals account, unlike the possession account, also explains the intuition 
that pride is often importantly tied to agency.  Our personal ideals help to structure our 
identities as the particular agents that we are.  Moreover, worthy personal ideals typically 
provide norms that govern our actions, emotions, and thoughts, for which we are, typically, 
morally responsible.   
Finally, the personal ideals account of pride—though it is a cognitivist account—does 
not entail that experiencing pride involves conscious and easily articulable judgments.  A 
person’s ideals—their conceptions of what sort of character, projects, relationships, and 
interests they should have—are often inchoate and difficult to identify and articulate.  Further 
work is needed in order to make sense of the very nature and ethical significance of such 
ideals, and to make sense of the ways in which we manifest our commitments to personal 
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1 See also Xenophon (1990, pp. 249-251, 4.56-64). 
2 For discussion and critique of the proposal that this partiality should be understood in 
terms of one’s moral responsibility for the existence or excellence of the object of pride, see 
Fischer (2017b).  
3 For two accounts of pride that invoke personal ideals, though in different ways, see Helm 2 discussi n and crit que of the proposal that this partiality should b  understood in 
terms of one’s moral responsibility for the existence or excellence of the object of pride, see 
Fischer (2017b).  
3 For two accounts of pride that invoke personal ideals, though in different ways, see Helm 
(2010) and Fischer (2017b).  
4 Thanks to Rachel Fredericks for this example.  
5 One might object that the weighing metaphor does not take the place of the belonging 
relation because the former is an evaluative condition that has to do with favorably valuing 
the object of pride rather than with being closely related to it.  This is not so, as we can see 
by considering that failures and other non-achievements can also weigh with one in the forms 
of regret and grief.  We hope, for example, that a war criminal’s actions come to weigh with 
him.  So, whether something weighs with one is independent of whether one values it 
favorably.  
6 See also Tracy and Robbins, who note, citing the example of feeling pride for an 
Olympic winner from one’s own country, “the collective self … can be an important elicitor 
of self-conscious emotions” (2004, p. 174).  
7 See Tracy and Robbins (2004) on the role of ideal self-representations in psychological 
models of pride.  
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8 For recent work on personal ideals, see Velleman (2002), Buss (2004), Brownlee (2010a 
and 2010b), Fischer (2017a), and Riggle (2017).  
9 In a similar spirit, Roberts observes of the pride relation that “We are tempted to try to 
reduce this attributed relationship to some essence.  Perhaps we can do no better than to 
enumerate the kinds of relationship in terms of which people can feel pride; the essential 
point is that, whatever these are, they are such that the subject sees whatever he is proud of as 
reflecting well on his own worth” (2003, p. 276).    
10 In other words, unlike fear and hope, pride is “factive” and not merely “epistemic,” in 
the sense that my accurate pride in the fact that I won the race entails that I won the race.  On 
the other hand, my fear that I will fail can be accurate even if, once the time comes, I happen 
to succeed, and my hope that we will prevail can be accurate even if, once the time comes, 
we fail.  See Chakrabarti (1992) for related discussion of whether “S is proud that p” entails 
“p. ” 
11 Wittgenstein offers what is, perhaps, another case that fails to satisfy condition (2): 
“When I have had a picture suitably framed or have hung it in the right surroundings I have 
often caught myself being as proud as though I had painted the picture” (1980, p. 17e).  
12 I am grateful to an anonymous referee of this journal for pressing me to articulate this 
claim. 
13 The truth of this claim is consistent with the fact that the racist himself would disagree 
with this assessment, since I assume that the worthiness of an ideal is an objective matter.  
14 This argument does not purport to establish that the standards of worthiness for personal 
ideals are objective.  Rather, it shows merely that in feeling pride, one judges one’s personal 
ideal(s) to be worthy of adoption or pursuit.  However, even if this third condition were non-
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cognitive, the objection to D’Arms and Jacobson’s noncognitivist argument could still 
succeed if the other two conditions were cognitive and non-possessive.  That objection 
requires only that there is a plausible account of pride as involving at least one judgment and 
no judgments about possession.   
15 Accounts of recalcitrance also must carefully distinguish emotional attitudes from 
generalized anxiety, a phenomenon sometimes conflated with jealousy or fear.  Minding this 
distinction is especially important when discussing cases like irrational aversion to flying or 
to harmless spiders.   
16 For discussion of how personal ideals ought to be evaluated, see Hare (1963), especially 
Sections 8 and 9, “Ideals” and “Toleration and Fanaticism”; Strawson (1961); and Rescher 
(1987).  
17 I am grateful to Rachel Fredericks, Angela Smith, William Talbott, Ingra Schellenberg, 
David Keyt, members of the Calgary Ethics Research Group, including Ann Levey, Noa 
Latham and David Dick, and two referees of Southwest Philosophy Review for helpful 
comments and discussion on earlier drafts of this article. 
